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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, LAW, AND
IMPLEMENTATION: A CLINICAL
DIMENSION FOR THE NEW
LEGAL PROCESS
Harold A. McDougall t
Lawyers seeking to implement the goals of social movements
("social movement lawyers") use litigation, legislation, and adminis-
trative advocacy to get discrete legal responses from the judicial,
legislative, and regulatory branches of government, respectively.'
They also use moral confrontation techniques, dialogue and
networking to influence government policy and public opinion and
to coordinate the activities of the three branches of government in
the process of policy implementation.
The networks social movement lawyers create as they go about
this work depend on verbal and written exchanges of information as
well as on positive law for their stability and coherence. Such ex-
changes of information are also characteristics of the model "inter-
pretive communities" which are central to the intellectual
movement known as the New Legal Process.2 According to New
t Associate Professor and Director of the Clinical Program in Law and Public Pol-
icy, School of Law, the Catholic University of America, and Visiting Professor, Cornell
Law School, Fall 1989. The Law and Public Policy Program is an experiment which
combines lawyering educational techniques, clinical externships, and academic study of
the role of law in the formation of public policy in the nation's capital.
I wish to thank William Eskridge, Phillip Frickey, Ray Marcin, Frank Michelman and
Martha Minow for criticism and comments. I also wish to thank my research assistants
Matthew Bradley, Kelly Breur, Alan Dumoff, Jeri Ezra, and Gretchen Lucken. All the
mistakes are mine.
1 On the interplay of the three branches of government in creating public policy,
see generally Harold A. McDougall, Lawyering and Public Policy, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 369
(1988). See also Douglas W. Kmiec, Of Balkanized Empires and Cooperative Allies: A Bicenten-
nial Essay on the Separation of Power, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 73 (1987), and Philip B. Kurland,
The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986).
2 The term "New Legal Process" has been coined by Professors Eskridge and
Frickey to describe a resurgence of ideas associated with "Legal Process" as originated
by Hart and Sacks in materials prepared for a course on legislation at Harvard Law
School in the 1950s. See infra notes 40 and 95 and accompanying text. See, e.g., WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1987) [hereinafter E & F I]; Paul Brest, Interpreta-
tion and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV.
1325 (1984); Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985) [hereinafter
Fiss, Conventionalism]; Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1986)
[hereinafter Fiss, The Death of the Law?]; Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
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Legal Process scholars, an interpretive community is a group cre-
ated by mutual discussion of a common text in an effort to find its
meaning. 3 The term originated in the field of literary criticism, 4 but
has been appropriated by legal scholars to connote a "discussion
group" of legal professionals attempting to find the meaning of a
legal text. 5 Of course, legal texts have a bite-state power-not or-
dinarily associated with literary texts. 6 This fact calls into question
the aptness of applying the term "interpretive" to any community
organized to deal in legal intervention.
Another term, found elsewhere in legal academic literature,
though not used by New Legal Process scholars, may shed light on
the activity of such legal discussion groups.7 The term is "imple-
mentation," and it has been used in the legal literature to describe a
circular process of debate, political struggle and compromise, oper-
ating at all levels of the legal system. Implementation theory tracks
the activities of social movements, the institutions and personnel of
the legal system itself, and the interest groups whose behaviors the
social movements desire to change.8
This Article examines the history and evolution of "discussion
groups" which aimed to create law and public policy in the area of
civil rights. During the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and
1960s, such groups created new norms of radical interaction by us-
STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982) [hereinafter Fiss, Objectivity]; Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights:
An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987). See also Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
3 See, e.g., Cover, supra note 2, at 46-48. The origin of this concept seems to lie
with Stanley Fish. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLAss? THE AUTHORITY
OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980); see also E & F I, supra note 2, at 333.
4 S. FIsH, supra note 3, at 171-72.
5 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 746-47.
6 Brest, supra note 2, at 769-70. But see S. FISH, supra note 3, at 343 (academia
presents strong sanctions for the "wrong" interpretation of a literary text). Despite
Fish's insight, there remains yet an important distinction. The legal "discussion group"
can sanction others 1vho are not party to the discussion. Brest, supra note 2, at 770.
7 See William H. Clune, III, A Political Model of Implementation and Implications of the
Model for Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Roles of Law and Lawyers, 69 IowA L. REV.
47 (1983).
8 Clune offers the following summary and overview of the implementation model:
(a) Reformist political fabrication ... implementation [is] the result of polit-
ical struggle and compromise between social movements and the interest
groups whose behaviors the social movements desire to change.
(b) Cybernetic interactionism... a continuous process of mutual adjustment
among interested organizations .... (c) Recursiveness [a circular process
in which] political forces . . . interact at all levels [of implementation],
including continuing disputes over the terms of the underlying legal
mandate. (d) Evolution. Notwithstanding [its] open and manipulable
character [i.e., recursiveness], implementation usually falls into character-
istic long-run patterns and may reach stable, dynamic equilibrium.
Id. at 78.
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ing dialogue and moral confrontation in a particularly powerful way.
In general, they did not rely on the legal system. To the contrary,
the legal system was often arrayed against them. I will refer to these
groups as "interpretive communities."9
In the 1970s and 1980s, these communities began to evolve
away from dialogue and confrontation and toward the implementa-
tion of civil rights legislation passed in the 1960s as the result of
their social movement activity. They retained some of their dialogic
and confrontational tactics, but tended to use such tactics for legal
implementation rather than moral suasion. I will refer to these
groups as "implementive communities."' 10 Contrasting the behav-
ior of implementive and interpretive communities will, I believe,
suggest that the work of social movement lawyers may add a signifi-
cant clinical discussion to the New Legal Process.
Parts I and II of this Article briefly review the origins of the
"old" Legal Process as a synthesis of legal formalism and legal real-
ism, and the erosion of that synthesis in the face of critiques from
the left by the Critical Legal Studies Movement, and from the right
by the Law and Economics Movements. In Parts I and II, parallel
intellectual trends from the field of physics are used to illuminate
differences among these various legal ideologies. The lack of pre-
cise correlations between inputs and outputs in a given system ("in-
determinacy of outcomes")" and the randomness of activity within
the system,' 2 for example, were key issues in both the erosion of
Legal Process and the erosion of Newtonian concepts of physical
science. Indeterminacy of outcomes and randomness within the sys-
tem also featured prominantly in the rise of new theories in the
fields of both law and the physical sciences. 13 Part II also introduces
the manner in which the conclusions which can be drawn from social
movement lawyers' practice transcends left and right critiques of the
"old" Legal Process, and also examines the manner in which their
practice itself provides an important clinical dimension to the New
Legal Process.
Part III continues this theme, using the Civil Rights Movement
9 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
10 An implementive community, then, is the system-oriented leadership group,
sprung from an interpretive community, which seeks to advance the social causes of the
community by resort to the legal system, including the courts, legislature, and adminis-
trative bureaucracy.
11 See Ray Marcin, Schopenhauer's Metaphysical Justice (1988) (unpublished manu-
script, copy on file with Cornell Law Review).
12 Id.
13 See Frank Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Plea for Disenchantment, 74 COR-
NELL L. REV. 256, 263 (1989) [hereinafter Fiss, Disenchantment] (American judges gener-
ally absorb the thinking of elite American intellectuals).
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as a clinical case study of how social movements "implementing"
their policy objectives within the framework of the New Legal Pro-
cess address the issues of randomness and indeterminacy which be-
deviled the "old" Legal Process and which encouraged its
detractors from both left and right. The Civil Rights Movement in
its first phase used moral confrontation and dialogue at the street
level to overcome randomness and incoherence-the sense that the
conditions of African-Americans were the result of random factors
beyond anyone's ability to control. Instead, the Movement created
connections among previously disparate social actors and built an
interpretive community around the issue of civil rights. In its sec-
,ond phase, the Movement used networking and coalition-building at
the policymaking level to overcome indeterminacy of outcomes bred
by a tripartite, nonparliamentary governmental system based on
separation of powers. Part IV concludes the Article by suggesting
that communities formed at the juncture of social movements and
government policy might prove to be useful models for New Legal
Process scholars to study.
I
NEWTONIAN THINKING IN LAW AND POLICY
Before the twentieth century, intellectual trends in physics and
in legal ideology both conceived of the universe as an ordered
machine made of separate parts, fit together in predictable ways and
following certain laws of motion. In this Newtonian vision of the
universe, outcomes were predictable and directly correlated with in-
puts. This view of the universe has powerfully influenced American
legal ideology since the American Revolution. Since the beginning
of the twentieth century, however, many of Newton's theories have
been superseded in physics by theories which concede that the uni-
verse often acts at random, but which note a surprising intercon-
nectedness between such random phenomena. 14 Legal scholars,
however, did not begin to question the predictability of our legal
system until somewhat later. At that point, modern developments
in the physical sciences began to appear in the view of the universe
fashioned by legal ideology as well. The following is an outline of
how the New Legal Process, Critical Legal Studies and the Law and
Economics Movements have attempted to address randomness and
indeterminacy in the legal system.
14 See, e.g., ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY, THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY (Rob-
ert W. Lawson trans. 1959).
[Vol. 75:83
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A. Newtonian Thinking in the Study of Law
From the beginning of the colonial period, Americans have
thought of the social movements in which they participate in legalis-
tic terms. 15 The colonial lawyers who created the ideological frame-
work for the American Revolution were strongly influenced by
"Newtonian" thinking.16 Newtonianism depicted a clock-like uni-
verse in which randomness (such as that which characterizes human
behavior) was not considered.' 7 James Madison, chief architect of
the Constitution, created a Newtonian government machine of sepa-
rated powers, "its checks and balances clicking like the parts of a
steam engine."' 8 His stated purpose was to establish a rule of law
capable of checking random human behavior which might stem
from unbridled communitarian self-government. His assumption
seemed to be that political freedom as communitarian self-govern-
ment and political freedom as the rule of law were not fully
compatible.19
At the Harvard Law School of the late nineteenth century, Dean
Langdell set out to mold the study of law in the image of Newtonian
science, divorcing it from the subjectivity and political ferment of
the "real world."' 20 Langdell proposed to the academy at large, and
Harvard University in particular, the thesis that appellate court
judges functioned like Newtonian scientists and applied identifiable
15 See Maxwell Bloomfield, Constitutional Values and the Literature of the Early Republic,
1 J. Am. CULTURE 53 (1988).
16 See Alvin Toffler, Making Sense for Our Chaotic World, Washington Post, Oct. 19,
1986, at H3, col. 1.
17 See id. See generally LAWRENCE W. FAGG, Two FACES OF TiME 1-23 (1985) (com-
paring the Newtonian, deterministic march-of-time idea with the new views of quantum
mechanics).
18 Toffler, supra note 16, at col. 1; see also Bloomfield, supra note 15, at 55 n.15
(Hamilton compared the Constitution's overall arrangement to the Newtonian solar
system).
19 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE LJ. 1493, 1500-01 (1988) [hereinafter
Michelman, Republic]. The first such social movement was the American Revolution,
during which the law replaced the overturned monarchy as a symbol of cultural and
ideological unity. Bloomfield, supra note 15, at 53; cf. Fiss, Conventionalism, at 197 (law
has a "special claim for our respect"). But see Michelman, Republic, supra, at 1508 n.53.
Newtonian legalism strongly contradicts the idea of today's social movement lawyers
that law is properly grounded in human social interaction.
20 Robert MacCrate, President-Elect of the American Bar Association, Remarks de-
livered at American Association of Law Schools Section on Clinical Legal Education
(Jan. 3, 1987) ("As leading law schools gradually won their place in the university, they
moved ... from the practical to the theoretical... [and] sought the total substitution of
law school study for any requirement of law office experience.").
This created some discomfort in the profession of legal education. See Anthony
Chase, American Legal Education Since 1885: The Case of the Missing Modern, 30 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 519, 521 (1985); see also Thomas F. Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided
Against Himself, 54 VA. L. REv. 637, 638 (1968) (inherent tension in law professor's striv-
ing to be both an "authentic academic" and a trainer of students for private practice).
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and predictable principles of law with consistent results. 21 As Pro-
fessor Lon Fuller later described the approach, "[where the ele-
ments of law] appear in combination, the lawyer's task is to analyze
the case into these basic elements, and then to deduce from them
the decision of the controversy, just as the physicist or chemist
might deduce the qualities of a substance from its molecular
structure." 22
In rendering the subject matter predictable and uniform, how-
ever, Langdellian "scientific jurisprudence" imposed a Newtonian
philosophical system upon the law at a time when such thinking was
nearly obsolete in the natural sciences. 23 Newtonian theories in the
natural sciences gave way as discoveries of interconnections among
matter, light, and energy suggested a picture of the universe bound
together in an organic whole. 24 Ironically, the apprenticeship
model which Langdell eschewed provided the student with an or-
ganic view of the law and its practice which was more consistent with
new directions in the natural sciences than did the Langdellian cur-
riculum. 25 Single-minded adherence to Newtonian ideas in juris-
prudence obscured connections among law, politics and community
which suggested a picture of society bound together in an organic
whole. 26 Issues regarding the law's proper role in building, as well
as disciplining the community were denied their proper emphasis. 27
Sociological Jurisprudence 2s and Legal Realism, 29 two laterju-
21 Chase, supra note 20, at 519. It took 15 of the 25 years Langdell was Dean at
Harvard Law School, 1870 to 1895, for the case method to take root.
22 Clark Byse, Fifty Years of Legal Education, 71 IowA L. REV. 1063, 1072 (1986).
23 See Marcin, supra note 11, at 22 (citing HEINZ R. PAGELS, THE COSMIC CODE:
QUANTUM PHYSICS AS THE LANGUAGE OF NATURE 11 (1982) (the work of physicists like
Bohr, Heisenberg, and Planck in quantum mechanics drastically revised the mechanical
view of the universe associated with Newton).
24 Robert Stevens, Legal Education: The Challenge of the Past, 30 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV.
475, 480 (1985) (ABA concerned that Langdell's case method "would destroy the con-
cept of law as an integrated series of interrelated, objective rules").
25 Marcin, supra note 11, at 23 (citing H. PAGELS, supra note 23, at 11-21); see also
JEREMY RIFKIN, ENTROPY-A NEw WORLD VIEW 221-25 (1980) (entropy law superseding
Newtonian mechanics in the natural sciences).
26 See Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1508-09 (constitutional limits on the
exercise of sovereignty require the separation of law from politics).
27 John Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy Or, The Case of the Empty Envelope, 36 STAN.
L. REV. 1517, 1530 n.33 (1984); see also Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1501 (law
and politics stand in circular relation to one another, as "both outcome and input, both
product and prior condition").
28 Sociological Jurisprudence, a school of legal thought of which Dean Roscoe
Pound was the founder, emphasized the place of law in its social context. See generally
Benjamin Andrew Zelermayer, Benjamin N. Cardozo: A Directive Force in Legal Science, 69
B.U.L. REV. 213, 238-41 (1989).
29 Legal Realism, a school of legal thought associated with luminaries such as Je-
rome Frank and Karl Llewellyn, is conceived of as an opposing school to that of legal
formalism. Legal realism attacked legal formalism's notion ofjudges as impartial rule-
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risprudential schools, addressed some of Langdell's shortcomings,
laying a foundation for the kind of contextual, community-based ap-
proach we now associate with social movement law.5 0 Sociological
Jurisprudence faulted the Langdellian approach (sometimes called
"formalism") 31 for its failure to take note of law's social context-
the historical, political, economic, social and psychological details of
the community in which law is made.32 Realists extended the cri-
tique, arguing that such factors which created the community cre-
ated the law as well.33 Realists argued that these factors affected
legal outcomes as strongly as precedent itself.34
With so many factors influencing legal outcomes, however,
none could be regarded as "determinative" in the way precedent
had been. No Newtonian rule "scientifically" applied to the facts
could guarantee a fair, or even an efficient, outcome.35 This ques-
tion of "indeterminacy" as a flaw in Newtonian legal theory was not
solved by the Realists, only identified insofar as the legal system is
concerned.36 The question remains, and it is a troubling one. Is it
possible to create a Newtonian, rule-based system sufficiently com-
prehensive of social context to fairly "determine" the outcome of
community disputes?
B. Public Policy: The Post-Industrial Challenge to Newtonian
Law and Legal Thinking
The chaos of the Great Depression suggested that Newtonian
appliers rather than conscious decision-makers, and encouraged more deference to the
political solutions of the legislature. See, e.g., Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist and Instrumen-
talist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119 (1985).
30 Essay, Critical Legal Studies: Beyond SkepticalJurisprudence, 11 J. CoNTEMP. L. 345
(1984) (authored by Jennifer M. Dowd).
31 See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Refleive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 239, 240 (1983); see generally ERVIN H. POLLACK, JURISPRUDENCE 521-633
(1979).
32 Note that Roscoe Pound, the originator of Sociological Jurisprudence, trained
Charles Hamilton Houston, one of the most important lawyers in the early Civil Rights
Movement, at Harvard Law School. See infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text. So-
ciological evidence proved critical in the favorable outcome of Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), thus establishing a direct line from Houston's activities at
Howard University Law School. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text. See gener-
ally GENNA RAE McNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
33 Teubner, supra note 31, at 240.
34 See, e.g., Byse, supra note 22, at 1073; Chase, supra note 20, at 533; Dowd, supra
note 30, at 346-47.
35 See Clune, supra note 7, at 105 ("massive discretion is created by the indetermi-
nacy of the operating legal system, including everything from the need to adjudicate
particular cases to the unsupervised field-level discretion of administrative agents").
36 Godel had already asserted the hypothesis in mathematics: a system of explana-
tion cannot be simultaneously complete and consistent. Ergo, there must be indetermi-
nacy in any system of explanation.
1989]
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separation of powers was an inadequate legal formula for governing
an increasingly interdependent society.37 New Dealers, many of
them Legal Realists, sought to solve this problem by using the ad-
ministrative bureaucracy' to coordinate the three branches of gov-
ernment.38 The New Deal's answer to the query of whether it is
possible to create a rule-based system comprehensive enough to
"scientifically" determine the proper outcome of community dis-
putes was thus to create a fourth branch of government.39
In the 1950s, Professors Hart and Sacks developed "Legal Pro-
cess" course materials at Harvard Law School which sought to blend
the policy-oriented approach of the Realists and New Dealers with
the rule orientation of the Formalists. 40 Legal Process views each
branch of government from a common set of assumptions: that pol-
icy is indeed the province of the law, that policy is made by the clash
of interested parties, and that the results of policymaking will be
rational if the clash proceeds according to rules. Lobbying groups
of equal power clash in the legislature.4 1 Litigants of equal power,
intelligence, and resources, represented by lawyers with no conflict
of interest, clash in the adversary system.42 Even bureaucracies are
disciplined by interest-group politics. 43
The Legal Process paradigm assumes that the activities of each
branch of government are rational insofar as those activities did not
stray beyond the "institutional competence" of the branch. The
branch's "institutional competence" is limited to that range of pol-
icy decisions which it can handle by dint of its resources, orienta-
37 See Kmiec, supra note 1, at 76 (lamenting the hard road those interested in posi-
tive government must follow given the division of authority at the national level).
38 See David E. Van Zandt, The New Legal Realism, 33 Yale Law Report No. 2, at 2, 3-
4 (Spring 1987) (alliance of New Dealers and Realists); see also Kmiec, supra note 1, at 77
(diffuse power secures liberty, but practice integrates dispersed power into workable
government); Kurland, supra note 1, at 593 (checks and balances suggest joinder, not
separation, of powers); Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447,
451 (1986) (New Deal as parliamentary government).
39 See REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE EMERGING CONsTrru-rION 592-621 (1974) (advo-
cating a new constitution including regulation and planning as the fourth and fifth
branches of government, respectively); see also Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Proce-
dure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L. REV. 219, 219-33 (1986) (New Deal regulatory state
consolidated by passage of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, finally defeating
conservatives such as Roscoe Pound who waged a ten-year campaign against New Deal
regulation).
40 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation, Scholarship and Pedagogy
in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 691, 694 (1987) [hereinafter E & F II]
(describing the origins of the Legal Process movement).
41 Id. at 697 n.16.
42 Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 513 (1986).
43 Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1276,
1284 (1984).
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tion, and mode of organization. Legal Process formulated rules to
help the various branches stay within the boundaries of institutional
competence. Such rules were thought to ensure that the branches
could rationally resolve disputes between subjectively motivated, es-
sentially adversarial parties.
The legislature, for example, could distill rational outcomes
from conflicting interests if it heard all interested parties and con-
ducted informed, deliberative, and efficient proceedings. 44 Legal
Process adherents developed similar rules for the other branches of
government. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set
up a model for adjudication which relaxed pleading and made infor-
mation more accessible, but which remained decidedly rule-based. 45
Similarly, the Administrative Procedure Act used a rule-based
model to govern administrative action.46
Legal Realists had challenged formalism by demonstrating that
rules could not fairly and consistently determine outcomes. 47 Legal
Process adherents countered by arguing that rules could still control
the processes by which outcomes were reached: rules of legislative
process, rules to govern litigation, and rules of administrative pro-
cedure. Legal Process scholars thus did not abandon the dominant
Newtonian legal vision of rules as a means of transforming a group
of atomized individuals into a rational machine.48 However, they
did shift the focus of attention from what the machine produced to
how it operated. Legal Process adherents believed that perfect out-
comes, unattained by inexorable rules, could yet be achieved by per-
fected scientific processes. 49
II
THE LIMrrs OF LEGAL PROCESS THEORY
The Legal Process synthesis of formalism, realism and the New
Deal does not sufficiently address the significant ways in which indi-
viduals are connected other than by the rule of law. The relations
among people stemming from their individual roles as lawyers,
judges, legislators, and citizens are certainly important. Equally im-
portant, however, are the relations among individuals which stem
from their social "group" roles, as members of families, churches,
44 E & F II, supra note 40, at 696.
45 See Resnik, supra note 42, at 494 n.1 (details of development and adoption of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); id. at 541 (Federal Rules inspired by belief that "bet-
ter procedures produced better facts which in turn yielded preferable outcomes").
46 See Gellhorn, supra note 39, at 221.
47 See E & F II, supra note 40, at 695 ("Some of the legal realists had mocked the
determinacy and objectivity of formal rules.").
48 Cf Dowd, supra note 30, at 347.
49 E & F II, supra note 40, at 698.
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races and ethnicities, economic classes, and social and historical
movements. 50
Such group connections are a constant source of inter-group
tension. Group connections are inevitably part of any social pro-
cess, making it very difficult to "tame" such processes by means of
formal rules, even those rules which seek only to regulate processes
rather than determine outcomes. At the same time, group connec-
tions account for intra-group cohesion, introducing another polit-
ical element which is as difficult to subdue as inter-group tension.
In attacking the synthesis of rules and relationships proposed by
Legal Process, the school of Law and Economics has followed the
theme of inter-group conflict. Critical Legal Studies, on the other
hand, has pursued the theme of intra-group cohesion.
A. The Law and Economics Challenge and the Social
Movement Lawyer's Response
Scholars from the Law and Economics movement depict legisla-
tion as a dynamic equilibrium in which law grows out of a series of
compromises fueled by legislators' desires to be re-elected, the ex-
pedient accommodation of special interests,5 1 and lobbying by indi-
viduals and groups. Legislators do not respond evenly to all
lobbyists in the Law and Economics view. They act most decisively
when a well-organized and politicall' influential group demands
protection from a law which will cause the group direct harm. 52
Like other residents of this universe, legislators act out of informed
self-interest. However, some legislators and lobbyists act ideologi-
cally, altruistically, or on the basis of incomplete information-i.e.,
at random.53 Because a process with significant random elements is
political rather than rational, Law and Economics scholars generally
recommend that judges eschew an activist role in "rationalizing" the
legislation the process produces. Judges, in their view, have no
business upsetting a political balance achieved by elected represent-
atives of the people.5 4
The Law and Economics model captures some essential ele-
ments of the legislative process which are observable from a clinical
50 See generally Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1417 (1984) (cer-
tain individual rights should be interpreted as communal rights).
51 E & F II, supra note 40, at 702-03.
52 Id at 704-05.
53 Id. at 704.
54 Id. at 707-08. This position has caused some to view the Law and Economics
movement as a revival of Langdellian formalism, and a right-wing attack on Legal Pro-
cess. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 2, at 765. But see MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND
BLUE 196 n. 17 (1988) (recent development of a "liberal reformist law-and-economics").
[Vol. 75:83
THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS
perspective. 55 The legislation which emerges on Capitol Hill is
often vague and incoherent, the result of a process which tries to
please too many people with too many rules.56 However, this hardly
means that courts and agencies should retire from the field. To the
contrary, legislators often see the other branches as part of the polit-
ical process. For example, they may leave issues ambiguous so
courts will have a broad range of discretion for statutory interpreta-
tion, or specifically delegate extensive discretion to administrative
agencies precisely to duck clashes between opposing interest groups
and instead pass them on.57 Madison's Newtonian scheme of sepa-
rate branches of government has thus largely been subverted into a
random system, in which outcomes are difficult even to predict,
much less determine.
Social movement lawyers in Washington have developed tactics
to function in the context of this random, indeterminate system and
ensure that their constituencies are not totally marginalized by gov-
ernment randomness. They view the legislature as a forum where
they can create frameworks around which to shape public policy, but
they trust no one branch of government with the entire project.58
Rather, social movement lawyers track legislation with which they
are concerned (and which they often initiate) as it courses through
the policy system. They monitor administrative agencies' imple-
mentation of such laws, and are prepared to challenge regulations at
the agency level and in court, review the results through oversight,
and alter the results through amendment and new legislation. 59
They also litigate directly under new statutes, and remain prepared
to lobby for oversight hearings, amendments, and new legislation to
modify results they obtain in court.60 This type of cross-branch ac-
55 See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES AND PUBLIC POLICIES 122-23
(1984) (policymaking process as a "primeval soup," in which ideas float around as mole-
cules floated around in the "primeval soup" before life began).
56 See Robert Sherrill, The Only Game in Town, Washington Post Book World, Apr. 3,
1988, at 2, col. 3 (review of HEDRICK SMrrH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON
WORKS (1988)) (members of Congress cannot handle the plethora of hearings, votes,
and caucuses, so they delegate to the unelected-lobbyists and staff).
57 E & F II, supra note 40, at 705-06.
58 Id. at 717 ("Creative lawmaking by courts and agencies is needed to ensure ra-
tionality and justice in law."); see also id at 721-23 (citing Calabresi, Dworkin, and Fiss for
new rationales supporting judicial activities and Mashaw, Sunstein, Stewart, and Strauss
on creative roles for administrative agencies).
59 Transactions are thus not confined within Newtonian chambers, hermetically
sealed one from the other; rather, they penetrate the barriers between separated pow-
ers. This penetration is facilitated by informal relationships and by the goals of the
system. See generally Cover, supra note 2, at 40-44 ("jurispathic" courts).
60 E & F II, supra note 40, at 717-25; see also id at 724 (the adherent of the New
Legal Process "rejects a view of lawmaking as a series of one-shot declarations of rules
and, instead, sees lawmaking as a dialectic and evolutive process").
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tivity, in which social movement lawyers often collaborate with one
another, as well as network and engage in dialogue with public offi-
cials, provides a clinical and practical dimension of the New Legal
Process. 6'
B. The Challenge of the Critical Legal Studies Movement 62
Some Critical Legal Studies scholars have posited a basic con-
tradiction between the claims of the individual and the claims of the
community, which contradiction could not be resolved by
Newtonian, "rule-based" techniques. 63 Choices among the claims
of the community, they contend, are political, arbitrary, and ad
hoc. 64 In their view, positive-law rules, far from resolving such dis-
putes with institutional competence and rational procedures, create
a false community which is really a mask for social domination.
Where Legal Process proposed rules to set rational limits for institu-
tionally competent decisionmakers, CLS denounced the use of rules
as susceptible to manipulation to "produce the results that social,
political, and personal factors dictate." 65 "Institutional compe-
tence" is thus illusory.66
CLS views Legal Process as perpetrating a hoax: that commu-
nity can be created without departing from a rule-based regime.67
Legal Process is thus a prime CLS target, to be "deconstructed,"
"delegitimated," and "trashed." 68 CLS adherents assert that judi-
61 By crossing the boundaries between separate branches, social movement lawyers
help transform the national government from a closed system to an open system, the
latter being much less likely to burn itself out and/or suffer energy loss through entropy.
See RIFKIN, supra note 25, at 241-44. In open systems, evolutionary advancement is pos-
sible. Id. at 241.
62 Byse, supra note 22, at 1081. For a history of CLS, see John Henry Schlegel,
Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated and Affectionate History of the Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 403-11 (1984).
63 Byse, supra note 22, at 1081.
64 Id.; see also Dowd, supra note 30, at 350; Michael A. Foley, Critical Legal Studies:
New Wave Utopian Socialism, 91 DICK. L. REV. 467, 483 (1986) ("CLS critiques the notion
of law as a formal, rational, objective, value-neutral system existing independently from
the social-political order in which it is located.").
65 Byse, supra note 22, at 1082.
66 But see Richard M. Fischl, Some Realism About Critical Legal Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 505, 530 (1987) (CLS rejects doctrinaire Marxism because CLS adherents do not
believe that legal outcomes are determined by the class system alone).
67 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Talking and Trading, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 899,
899 (1985) ("liberal" view: legal discourse is both "alienating and liberating" because
both intimacy and subjugation are renounced). Compare Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and
the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 570 (1986) ("radical"
view: synthesis of individual and community).
68 Foley, supra note 64, at 468-83. Deconstruction aims to expose the false assump-
tions and questionable reasoning of liberalism. Delegitimation works to uncover the
intimate (and presumably illicit) relationship between law and politics. The purpose of
"trashing" is to challenge hierarchy and order as well as rules, clearing the way for a
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cial review is political, 69 that legislation is foisted upon a passive and
ignorant majority by a Congressional elite,70 and that agencies are
self-contained and out of control. 71 Such CLS positions have cre-
ated a perception that they attack Legal Process from the left.72
Some view CLS as a Marxist movement, others as a nihilist
movement. 73
Many social movement lawyers would formally reject CLS's
stark portrayal of the law and public policymaking process. They
accept the chaotic, even venal milieu existing in the Capital and
would dismiss alternative formulations of democracy as utopian and
a waste of valuable time. However, social movement lawyers may
grudgingly accept the CLS view when off-hours talk turns to "burn
out." The power game in Washington has so many rules, "so many
intangible sources of power, so many playing fields ... that there is
no reasoned plan to it." 74 Such political fragmentation "obliterates
any sense of coordinated substantive purpose" and makes it difficult
for social movement lawyers to sustain their activities without some
type of networking and community-building among themselves.75
The fragmentation and chaos observed in the Capital cor-
roborates that part of CLS theory which views law as derived from
objective social occurrences and subjective social perceptions, and
thus "wholly contingent and subject to change."' 76 Such disorder
and entropy can be clinically approached only by abandoning the
closed, rule-based system of the Formalists and Legal Process ad-
herents and substituting theories that view society as an open sys-
tem which is not rule-based-i.e., a community. 77
fundamental change in human relationships. See also Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystifi-
cation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36
STAN. L. REv. 293, 321-22 (1984).
69 See Mark V. Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1502, 1503 (1985).
70 See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 56, at 2, col. 2 (the electorate is powerless and "TV-
addled").
71 See Frug, supra note 43, at 1284.
72 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 2, at 765.
73 Brest, supra note 2, at 765 (CLS attacked as the "new nihilism"); Fiss, The Death of
the Law?, supra note 2, at 10; Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 740.
74 See, e.g., Sherrill, supra note 56, at 2, col. 1 (chaos, despair, stalemate and disar-
ray, fraud, greed, incompetence, and "endless ventilation of the same spent themes" too
much a part of the Washington policymaking arena); see also Clune, supra note 7 (massive
discretion created by indeterminacy of legal system in operation).
75 Clune, supra note 7, at 107.
76 Byse, supra note 22, at 1082.
77 The "post-industrial" indeterminacy of CLS thus provides an important counter-
point to the Newtonian determinacy of the Formalists, which still survives in the Legal
Process synthesis of formalism and realism. See Toffler, supra note 16, at H3, col. 1
("Newtonianism" of the industrial era challenged by "Post-industrial" science which fo-
cuses on the instability and disorder characteristic of the modern world). But see Frug,
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Critical Legal Studies believes that Legal Process, because it is
rule-based, discourages visions of how such community might be
achieved. 78
CLS scholars assert that Legal Process encourages us to believe
that adequate levels of social organization may be achieved merely
by following rules. 79 CLS maintains, to the contrary, that rules man-
age social conflict by repressing the need for personally meaningful
experiences of autonomy, individuality, morality and community.8 0
CLS thus opposes any legal discourse which replaces the existential
value of human individuality, intimacy, and solidarity with a reliance
on rules. 81 But CLS has as yet failed to identify a way in which the
kind of community necessary to overcome the entropy of the pres-
ent system can be established, or even to tell us much about its iden-
tifying characteristics.82
What is needed is a paradigm which approaches law as it is so-
cially experienced, that is, as a pattern of random encounters. Ac-
tors in the law and policymaking system group together, disperse,
and come together again in ways not fully explicable by rule-based
theories such as the "old" Legal Process. But this does not mean
that every attempt to make sense out of this system must self-de-
struct in nihilism. New ways of looking at the world, which have
their antecedents in intuition 83 and experience, 84 seem more and
more promising. Useful paradigms also exist in the natural sci-
ences, where relativity has displaced Newtonianism, portraying a
world "full of numerous unrealized tendencies for action... contin-
supra note 43, at 1320-21 (liberal world wholly ingrained-makes it difficult to recog-
nize/accept new forms of organization).
78 Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE
LJ. 69 (1984).
79 Foley, supra note 64, at 476 & 483.
80 Dowd, supra note 30, at 352.
81 Foley, supra nete 64, at 481.
82 See Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 2, at 194; Cover, supra note 2, at 44; see also
Foley, supra note 64, at 494 (CLS has not progressed beyond assertion that law is an
extension of politics). But see Singer, supra note 78, at 69 (sketch of values to be pursued
in new community); compare Warren Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis.
L. REV. 489. Part of this failure may stem from the fact that Critical Legal Studies, like
all legal theories and ideologies discussed thus far with the exception of Legal Realism,
does not have a clinical component.
83 Marcin, supra note 11, at 32 (science progressing "toward an aim which the po-
etic intuition may appreciate, but which the intellect can never fully grasp").
84 There is a "logic of experience" which seems to combine intuition and intellect.
See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN
ADVOCACY 303 (1978) ("logic of experience" a thought process developed from intui-
tion, creativity, and imagination through disciplined experience); see also Clune, supra
note 7, at 53-54 (connecting notions of the "logic of experience" with the development
of "systems theory" in the psychotherapy and cybernetics fields).
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ually on the move, growing, merging, dying."8 5
Our legal and policy system reflects the chaos and entropy of
the material world.86 That random, indeterminate world now defies
description by Newtonian jurisprudence and its succeeding legal
ideologies. 8 7 Events are random but are nonetheless connected.
The actions of a single person-say, a Rosa Parks-can have conse-
quences, positive and negative, far beyond the purview of
Newtonian theories of causation. One approaches such a world by
appreciating that it is not composed of isolated "building blocks"
but rather "appears as a complicated web of relations between vari-
ous parts of the whole."88 This in fact is how the Civil Rights Move-
ment was built.
The system, though perhaps indeterminate, is not necessarily
unpredictable. "Possibilities" or "probabilities" take the place of
rules, and actors make choices based on available resources and
likely outcomes rather than a "sure thing." The presence of ran-
domness and indeterminacy in the legal and policymaking system
thus does not indicate that we cannot control outcomes, and there-
fore should consider ourselves less responsible for them. To the
contrary, our sense of responsibility needs to extend beyond its
present limits, because our behavior can have consequences far be-
yond those discernible through the lens of Newtonian science.89
This blind spot in the Newtonian model underscores our need
for a paradigm which encourages us to take individual responsibility
for the consequences truly stemming from our own behavior, and
not just as atomizcd actors connected only by rules of formalistic
law. Taking responsibility for the consequences of individual choice
which manifest themselves at the collective level is facilitated when
individuals see themselves as part of a community. Members of
such a community perceive social reality in terms of "weblike, inter-
connected, and intersubjective dynamics." 90 The community is
85 Marcin, supra note 11, at 28.
86 On the chaos of the material world, see JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW
SCIENCE (1987).
87 Cf K.C. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education,
34 Am. U.L. REV. 1141 (1985) (systems theory proffers the emptiness of randomness as
the only alternative to mechanistic connections).
88 Marcin, supra note 11, at 31.
89 As a social movement activist named Shelly Smith put it,
life is an infinite game of chess, in which there are an infinite number of
complex moves possible. The choice is open, but [each] move contains
within itself all future moves. One is free to choose, but what follows is
the result of one's choice. From the consequences of one's action there is
never any escape.
Newsletter of the 14th & U Street Coalition, January 1988, at 3.
90 Worden, supra note 87, at 1143 ("female voice" reasoning inseparable from the
contextual web of relationships within which it operates).
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bound together by a "morality based on the values of continuity,
communication, and interdependence... valuing relationship over
right, subjectivity over objectivity, and care over conquest."91
In contrast, the law and policy system may ignore a social move-
ment lawyer who does not use "rights talk," 92 even though the use
of such rule-based dialogue has a tendency to alienate the social
movement lawyer from her community, her ultimate constituency. 93
It is a cruel paradox-one which is not resolved by eschewing rights
talk, certainly, but neither is it resolved by ignoring the pressure
rights talk exerts to push social movement lawyers in elitist and ulti-
mately self-defeating directions. Social movement lawyers can
bridge this paradox by keeping open lines of dialogue with constitu-
ents of the social movements while using rights talk in their dealing
with actors in the legal system.94
C. The Response of the New Legal Process to Challenges of
CLS and Law and Economics, and a Critique of Fiss's
Interpretive Community
The New Legal Process is an attempt to update the "old" Legal
Process and create a jurisprudential form which can withstand criti-
cism from the left (CLS) and the right (Law and Economics). This
attempt is primarily associated with Professor Owen Fiss. Professor
Fiss attempts to manage the ambivalence about community surfaced
by these critiques with a model "interpretive community," largely
comprised of legal professionals. These professionals are bound to-
gether by ongoing conversation about the meaning of legal rules.
Fiss's conception of community is problematic, however. It cannot
withstand the intellectual forces described in Sections A and B
above. Fiss's conception needs a clinical focus.
Actual participation in a community which provides a context
for moral and political behavior, and which has some power to influ-
ence social outcomes, helps social movement lawyers make sense of
the entropic disorder and incoherence identified by the Law and Ec-
91 Id. (moral dilemma is context-bound and entails personal choice rather than
equational abstraction).
92 See, e.g., Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transforma-
tion and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Patricia
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 401 (1978) (discussing need of minorities to continue to use rights talk despite
blandishments of CLS adherents to the contrary).
93 See, e.g., William E. Forhath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1109, 1236 (1989); Randall L. Kennedy, The Racial Critiques of Legal Education,
102 HARv. L. REV. 1745 (1989) (critique of authors mentioned supra note 92).
94 Arthur Kinoy, The Role of the Radical Lawyer and Teacher of Law, in LAw AGAINST
THE PEOPLE 267, 287 (Robert Lefcourt ed. 1971).
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onomics and Critical Legal Studies theories. 95 The "republican"
tradition in law, perhaps more than the liberal "Newtonian" tradi-
tion, emphasizes such coherence, connectedness, and community.96
The Constitution was a compromise between the liberal,
Newtonian thinking of a Madison and the republican, pre-industrial
thinking of a Jefferson. 97 Both currents are evident in the Constitu-
tiouj.98 While liberalism seeks a balance of power among
branches, 99 republicanism looks to the legislature to discern, articu-
late, and instill the values and norms of the community. 00 Each has
its limits. 10 Moreover, tension between the two has been manifest
since the very beginning of United States history. 0 2
Liberalism in law, as it developed from Newtonian Formalism
to Legal Process, virtually ignored the randomness and incoherence
which actually occurs in social life, particularly the indeterminacy
which stems from conflicts between the individual and the commu-
nity. Might a republican approach serve such purposes better than a
liberal approach? Could social actors in such a community learn to
resolve some or even many of their conflicts by dialogue in lieu of
rules, clearing the way for comprehensive policymaking to which
95 Such communities have been called "mediating institutions," see Gerald E. Frug,
The City As A Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1072 (1981), and "jurisgenerative"
communities. Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 4 & n.28 (citing Cover, supra note 2,
at 4, 19). Through participation in such communities, one may experience a "collapse"
of ego boundaries. See MORGAN Scoirr PECK, THE ROAD LESS TRAVELLED (1978); see also
Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) ("inter-
subjective zap"); Marcin, supra note 11, at 33 (interconnectedness of the universe ob-
servable in the hard sciences).
96 M. TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 6-7.
97 The Constitution blunted the Revolution's republican thrusts toward liberty and
equality to accommodate businessmen, landowners, and professionals who demanded
protection from the power of the masses in the legislature. The Articles of Confedera-
tion, with their emphasis on the power of the legislature to articulate community values,
embraced republicanism but were viewed as inhospitable to property interests. Bloom-
field, supra note 15, at 3; see also M. TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 13-15; Bloomfield, supra
note 15, at 5 (Constitution shows influence of Montesquieu); Michelman, Republic, supra
note 19, at 1508 & n.53. C-rtainly the Constitution is very different from the Declara-
tion of Independence in this respect. See Bloomfield, supra note 15.
98 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 31
(1985); see also Kmiec, supra note 1, at 74 (common purposes of the Republic stated
eloquently in the Constitution's preamble).
99 Madison vigorously distrusted power concentrated in the legislature, see Kurland,
supra note 1, at 596, and cautioned against the danger of powerful factions seizing con-
trol of it. Id. at 597-98. He implored government officials to resist the legislature's
encroachment. Id. at 600 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison)).
100 Sunstein, supra note 98, at 29.
101 Liberalism has become rule-oriented, while republicanism has suspicious as-
sociations with limited franchise and the inequality of wealth. See infra note 174 and
accompanying text.
102 See Bloomfield, supra note 15, at 12 (Jefferson's election ended a constitutional
crisis through the peaceful transfer of power from one ruling group to another).
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virtually the entire community would adhere? 10 3
Large-scale social movements such as those concerned with the
need for comprehensive policy in the areas of civil rights, the envi-
ronment, peace, and women's rights have forcefully articulated such
visions of community as an addition to, or substitute for, the
Newtonian governmental schema associated with liberalism.104 The
great social movements of the 1960s and 1970s created community
through dialogue and other forms of human interaction, struggling
toward a republican community on a national scale.
Professor Fiss has advanced the thesis that a community created
by conversation occurring wholly within the legal process might
constitute an "interpretive community" which could give a legal
text, whether statute or court opinion, a legitimacy stemming from
consensus beyond that which is possible to achieve by the imposi-
tion of positive law.' 0 5 This paradigm, aimed primarily at CLS, an-
swers not only the CLS view that Legal Process is merely a
smokescreen for instrumental use of positive law by powerful fac-
tions, but also the CLS view that positive law cannot create commu-
nity out of social incoherence.
A principal shortcoming to Professor Fiss's notion of an "inter-
pretive community," however, is that the community thus defined is
made up of lawyers and judges who wield state power. Thus, the
community is not only exclusive, but also has the capacity to use
state power to coerce the compliance of any who disagree with its
interpretations.10 6 Indeed, state institutions such as courts would
not even be involved in the dialogue were it not for a basic conflict
in society and among its individual members which discussion has
not resolved.i07 When the liberal state creates a single normative
world, it does so not through interpretation, but through political
domination. 0 8
For this reason, the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s
are more deserving of the term "interpretive community" than the
association of legal professionals described by Professor Fiss.
103 See E & F I, supra note 2, at 333; Michelman, Disenchantment, supra note 13, at 266
(some measure of the organic view of the community associated with republicanism is
necessary for comprehensive policymaking).
104 Clune, supra note 7, at 108.
105 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 744-45 (interpretive community is one which rec-
ognizes designated rules as authoritative), and at 750 (to view adjudication as interpreta-
tion "makes law possible"); see also Brest, supra note 2, at 767 (paraphrasing Fiss).
106 Brest, supra note 2, at 770-71; see also Cover, supra note 2, at 40-44 ("jurispathic"
courts).
107 Brest, supra note 2, at 769; see also Cover, supra note 2, at 40 ("[Tlhejurisgenera-
tive principle by which legal meaning proliferates in all communities never exists in iso-
lation from violence.").
108 Cover, supra note 2, at 43.
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These social movements sought to expand their membership and to
secure adherence to their norms through dialogue, nonviolent con-
frontation and force of example. 10 9 They sought to create a single
normative world through moral suasion, by unifying the interpreta-
tion of system actors of moral standards, rather than by coercing
compliance with an elite's interpretation of moral standards and du-
ties. That they ultimately could not incorporate all members of the
larger civil community is not an indication of their failure, but rather
a clear indication that there may be a limit to the physical size which
any such community can reach without loosening the bonds that tie
it together. 110
Contrasted with Fiss's idea of an interpretive community as pri-
marily involving legal professionals is Cover's idea that interpretive
communities of lay persons create law within themselves, a process
which can be actually hindered, rather than facilitated, by participa-
tion in the legal system.11' Cover conceives of law as a system of
meaning, rather than of power. While law as power may frame the
development of such a community, it is the moral power of human
interaction and struggle which gives the community its force, its par-
ticular "nomos."t12
The following section shifts from an examination of theory to
practice: Juan Williams's excellent narrative of the Civil Rights
Movement" 3 is summarized in order to illustrate the development
of the "nomos" of an interpretive community, and the legal imple-
mentation of that nomos. 114
109 Cf Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 2, at 184 (Fish views the interpretive commu-
nity not as source of authority for disciplining rules, but rather a source of shared under-
standings), and at 190 (Fish argues. that "instinctive form[s] of knowledge" rather than
rules cause an interpretive community to cohere). On such instinctive forms of knowl-
edge, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
110 See Cover, supra note 2, at 34 (interpretive communities turn to the state at the
void into which their bonds cannot reach); see also Frug, supra note 94, at 1070-71 (esti-
mating that 40,000 members is a viable size for a republican community, using Greek
city-states and smaller East European cooperatives as examples).
111 See Cover, supra note 2, at 18 ("IT]here is a radical dichotomy between the social
organization of law as power and the organization of law as meaning .. "); see also id. at
6 n.11 (hermeneutics destroyed "in the necessarily apologetic functions of an
officialdom").
112 Id. at 9 ("The tradition includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a
[set of] myths [which] establish ... paradigms for behavior.").
113 JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE (1988).
114 As a field worker for the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, I lived
some of the history that Mr. Williams narrates, and thus I add my own experiences to
his.
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III
ON IMPLEMENTATION AND INTERPRETATION: CIVIL RIGHTS
AND THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS
A. The Civil Rights Movement: Building An Interpretive
Community
The Civil Rights Movement, which Cover would call a "re-
demptive" rather than an "insular" community, 1 5 is a direct de-
scendant of the abolitionist movement of the 1800s, which
considered the Constitution's compromises on the issue of slavery a
betrayal of the rights of Americans of African descent." 16 There was
a great deal of groundwork done-legal, political, and social-to
create the conditions for the Civil Rights Movement.1 7 It was nec-
essary to convince the American people that segregation, like slav-
ery and the black codes before it, violated a higher law. That higher
law was natural law, central to the republican tradition and, though
compromised in the Constitution, it remained strong in the Declara-
tion of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the spirit of the Ameri-
can Revolution. 1 8
Charles Hamilton Houston, one of the most prominent black
lawyers of this century, was a 1922 Harvard Law School graduate
and a proteg6 of both Roscoe Pound, the originator of Sociological
Jurisprudence, 1 9 and Felix Frankfurter, a prominent Legal Realist
and a "social movement" lawyer in his own right. 120 Houston took
Pound's theories to Howard Law School, where he worked to get
the school accredited by the AALS and to create a cadre of black
lawyers trained in activist constitutional law and sociological
jurisprudence.' 2 '
Houston wanted Howard to produce black social engineers,
who could use the law in the social movement for civil rights
launched by the founding of the NAACP in 1909.122 The NAACP
had begun amassing data on segregation and its consequences while
Houston was still at Harvard. By 1933, the organization had devel-
oped a legal strategy for combatting the doctrine of "separate but
equal" which had held sway since Plessy v. Ferguson.123 In 1935,
115 See Cover, supra note 2, at 10, 47.
116 Id. at 35-36.
117 See generally G. McNEIL, supra note 32 (overview of the role of leading legal tacti-
cians in Civil Rights Movement).
118 Kinoy, supra note 94, at 283-84.
119 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 4.
120 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 115-16 (1976).
121 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 5, 7. Thurgood Marshall was one of his top stu-
dents. Id. at 7.
122 Id. at 8-9.
123 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[Vol. 75:83
THE NEW LEGAL PROCESS
Houston took a leave of absence from Howard to direct the
NAACP's legal campaign. 124 Houston planned to first attack segre-
gation in the graduate schools and then work his way down to the
elementary school level. Typically, separate graduate schools were
not provided in the South, because so few blacks advanced beyond
undergraduate degrees. Using this strategy, Houston and Marshall
achieved significant victories. 125 In 1946, Marshall founded the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund to pursue more of these cases.126
Houston's illustrious career as a lawyer did not blind him to the
essential connection between legal strategy and social movement,
however.1 27 In 1948, Houston left the NAACP and helped initiate a
school strike among poor blacks who protested the separate but un-
equal conditions in the black schools of Washington, D.C. 128 It was
this school strike movement which led to the consensus in the black
community of the day that segregation had to be demolished, rather
than merely challenged as "unequal."' 129
Local whites threatened and intimidated the plaintiffs in early
school segregation lawsuits.' 30 Black parents pressed their rights
regardless, spurred on by their concern over the damage segrega-
tion was doing to their children.' 3 ' They were not satisfied with
legal strategies alone, and interest in direct social action such as
school strikes continued unabated. Students in Virginia struck in
1951.132
Brown v. Board of Education'3" used the circuits of the legal sys-
tem-since the Revolutionary War the country's primary network of
cultural and ideological legitimation-to send out a message that
segregation was wrong. For the black professionals of the Legal De-
124 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 10.
125 See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black at Univer-
sity of Oklahoma Graduate School must receive same treatment as students of other
races); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (black admitted to University of Texas Law
School); Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (black admitted to University of Mis-
souri Law School).
126 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 16.
127 Id. at 15.
128 Id. at 16.
129 Id. at 17-18. The strike eventually spun off a segregation suit, Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954), which was incorporated with the first Brown case for hearing in
1953. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
130 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 19.
131 Dr. Kenneth Clark's tests with black and white dolls provided key sociological
evidence in the Brown decision. Id. at 20, 23. Dr. Clark showed black children a white
doll and a black doll, asking them to associate positive and negative characteristics with
each. The black children associated the black doll with negative characteristics, the
white doll with positive. The last question in the interview was "Which doll is most like
you?" at which point the children invariably showed signs of extreme stress. Id.
132 Id. at 25.
133 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
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fense Fund, the decision affirmed the legitimacy of the legal sys-
tem.1 3 4 Mississippi SenatorJames Eastland denounced Brown for its
reliance on sociological evidence, however.135 The Court itself later
blunted the Brown ruling with the formulation "all deliberate speed"
(apparently a concession by ChiefJustice Warren to Justice Stanley
Reed, who had threatened to dissent from the otherwise unanimous
Brown opinion). 136
Professor Fiss considers "all deliberate speed" a foray into
political strategy which undercut the interpretive role of the
Court. 137 Another view might be that the Court is not an inter-
preter but a lawmaker, and that the politics of compromise is a natu-
ral part of the Court's job description. 138 Whether one's view is one
of disappointed optimism about the Court, or redeemed skepticism,
it is certainly true that the limitations of the Brown decision caused
many blacks and civil rights workers to develop a very ambivalent
attitude about the legal system and its utility compared to tactics of
direct social confrontation. The lawlessness of their oppressors fur-
ther undermined the faith of black people in the legal system. 139
The lynching of Emmett Till, a black Chicago elementary
school student while on summer vacation in Mississippi in 1955, was
a case in point. Till's attackers were acquitted after a seventy-five
minute deliberation by an all-white, all-male jury and all the black
witnesses to the killing who testified had to leave the state. 140 Till's
murder, and more pointedly, the denial ofjustice in his case, galva-
nized black people all over the country. 14 1 Attempts to intimidate
blacks, so long successful, began to have the opposite effect, inciting
increased resistance instead.
The leadership of the Civil Rights Movement shifted from law-
yers to organizers who relied on extra-legal tactics to construct a
social reality which would conform to the Brown vision. During the
nine years from the first Brown decision to the 1963 March On
Washington, this new strategy electrified the nation. Spirited civil
rights demonstrations, sit-ins, and freedom rides, along with ruth-
134 See J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 34-35.
135 Id. at 38.
136 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II); seeJ. WILLIAMS,
supra note 113, at 33. Further, the Brown Court declined to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson.
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495. See Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1524 n.120.
137 Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 760-61.
138 See M. TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 120-21.
139 Not only did the Ku Klux Klan threaten violence, the newly-formed urban, mid-
dle-class White Citizen's Councils worked to disrupt jobs, credit, and mortgages of
blacks associating with civil rights advocates. J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 39.
140 Id. at 45.
141 Id. at 44. (According to a newspaper survey, five of every six black radio preach-
ers devoted their sermons to the Emmett Till case).
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less opposition to such efforts, marked the period.1 42
The Civil Rights Movement gained momentum, placing more
and more blacks in direct confrontation with the system of segrega-
tion, official and unofficial, public and private. Within a year of Em-
mett Till's murder, the Montgomery bus boycott had started. 143
Black children who were Emmett Till's age in 1955, and read about
his death, were the eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds who in 1959
started the sit-ins and freedom rides which eventually contributed to
the collapse of Southern segregation. 144
As the tide of the social movement's direct confrontation tactics
rose through the first half of the 1960s, ambivalence about the legal
system grew more acute. Civil rights workers were very much aware
of the assistance the Brown judges had given the Civil Rights Move-
ment, but they were also aware of the harm done by local judges
who issued injunctions against strikes and demonstrations. 145 The
federal bureaucracy, the National Guard, the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation and Congress stepped in to assist civil rights advocates
only with the greatest reluctance and delay. FBI agents assigned to
protect civil rights workers were often Southerners who, like FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, were convinced that the Civil Rights
Movement was a Communist plot.' 46
B. The Turn To Implementation 147
Nomos establishes community paradigms for acquiescence as
well as for resistance, and more importantly, provides ways to navi-
gate the continuing tension between fighting and giving in.148 At
some point, a social movement confronts the reality that it cannot
replace the civil community. It cannot grow too large without losing
its moral coherence, and risks disintegration should it attempt to
expand too far. 149 There was a limit to the number of people in our
civil community the Civil Rights Movement could "redeem" in
moral and racial terms. At the same time, a social movement's op-
142 Id. at 197.
143 Id. at 57.
144 Id. The black press played a key role in molding black opinion. Id. at 50-51.
145 Id. at 173.
146 Id at 179. Martin Luther King, Jr., felt that Robert Kennedy's Justice Depart-
ment actually worked to undermine the Civil Rights Movement in Albany, Georgia. Id.
147 Implementation theory in law and the social sciences is linked to "systems
theory" in the natural sciences. For a description of systems theory, see generally
LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY (1968), LUDWIG VON
BERTALANFFY, PERSPECTIVES ON GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: SCIENTIFIC-PHILOSOPHICAL
STUDIES (1975) and EDGAR F. HUSE & THOMAS G. CUMMINGS, ORGANIZATION
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE (3d ed. 1985).
148 Cover, supra note 2, at 6 ("To inhabit a nomos is to know how to live in it.").
149 Cf id. at 44.
1989]
106 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:83
position may be prepared to use violence, and the state's protection
may be required to avoid bloody conflicts. Ironically, the Civil
Rights Movement leadership needed the coercive power of the state
to create conditions under which they could continue to employ
non-violent techniques.
Despite the "jurispathic" tendencies of the state encountered
by civil rights workers on the front lines and in the courts, the Move-
ment's leadership eventually sought the state's assistance in order to
achieve some closure on their objectives. 150 The Civil Rights Move-
ment began by using legal ideology to articulate its aims, but wound
up modifying its aims in order to enhance its participation in the
legal system. 15'
There were dissenters from this process. For some time after
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 addressed the issue of segregation in
public accommodations, 152 the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), the most radical wing of the Movement, contin-
ued to stress nonviolent direct action.' 53 Even SNCC acceded, how-
ever, to Attorney General Robert Kennedy's recommendation that
the Civil Rights Movement focus on voter registration. In fact,
SNCC's determined drive to register voters in Mississippi laid the
groundwork for the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
The Congress of Federated Organizations (COFO) focused the
strength of SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), 15 4 the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 155 and the Na-
150 See id at 11 & n.30 (state becomes central when commitment is required).
151 According to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, developed in physics, any actor
joins the system in which he or she operates or even studies, and must be aware of his or
her own effects. Social movements may in this sense be considered part of the legal
system as soon as they attempt to influence the path of the law. J. RIFKIN, supra note 25,
at 221-22; see also Cover, supra note 2, at 43 ("[I]t would be strange indeed to find the
redemptive constitutionalist unwilling to concede the superior practical effects of secur-
ing the acquiescence ofjudges, legislators, and governors in the radical revisions that he
offers up as the only true constitutional meanings.").
152 Memo, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (June 1987), at I [hereinafter
LCCR I]; see also J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 226. The Civil Rights Act was signed
into law on July 2, 1964.
153 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 200-01 (SNCC Chairperson John Lewis's speech
at the march was toned down considerably in response to objections from Cardinal
O'Boyle and entreaties from Martin Luther King, Jr., among others). See generally How-
ARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEw ABOLITIONISTS (1964).
154 The Congress of Racial Equality was formed in the late 1940s and was originally
an organization dedicated to the integration of all public facilities. One of CORE's most
important strategies was the "Freedom Ride," during which groups of African-American
and European-American students rode buses together across several Southern states, in
violation of the laws segregating public facilities in those states. See AUGUST MEIER &
ELLIOT M. RUDWICK, CORE, A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1942-1968
(1973); see also Note, Berghman v. United States, 59 TULANE L. REV. 793, 793-94 (1985)
(authored by Michael Kaplan).
155 The Southern Christian Leadership Conference, an organization of African-
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tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) 156 on voting discrimination in Mississippi, considered the
most recalcitrant of Southern states. "Freedom Summer," as it was
called, brought middle-class white college students to Mississippi by
the hundreds to help in the voter registration effort. 157 Of the 800
students participating, 600 were white and 300 were women.' 58
The presence of these white and female students broadened the
base of the Civil Rights Movement tremendously. Moreover, many
of these students went on to initiate social movements in their own
right, addressing questions of war and peace, the rights of women,
environmental quality, and community development and
empowerment. 59
The Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), created by
COFO, challenged the credentials of the regular Mississippi delega-
tion at the 1964 Democratic National Convention and attempted to
seat an integrated delegation in its stead. However, President Lyn-
don Johnson had already promised Mississippi Governor Paul John-
son that the regular delegation would be seated.' 60 A proposed
compromise, which would seat the regular delegation and two of the
MFDP delegates, was crafted by Hubert Humphrey and Walter
Mondale. The compromise proved unacceptable to both sides, and
ended with a sit-in by the MFDP.' 61 SNCC, especially, was bitterly
disappointed by the result, and began to evolve into a militant black
nationalist organization. By 1968, the Civil Rights Movement had
split into a middle-class, system-oriented professional group and a
rag-tag band of students and militants, alienated from the legal pro-
cess, whose proposed solutions to the race problem became more
extreme as their numbers dwindled. 162
American ministers throughout the Southern United States, was formed as a result of
the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott initiated by Ms. Rosa Parks. See generally DAVIDJ.
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986).
156 The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is the nation's
oldest civil rights organization. It was founded in Niagara, New York, in 1906 by a
group of leaders of both African and European descent. See Harry A. Blackmun, Section
1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?,
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1985).
157 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 228.-
158 Id at 230.
159 These movements have also developed legal and policymaking apparatuses just
as the Civil Rights Movement has done.
160 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 234.
161 Id. at 243. Soon after this, SNCC made contact with Malcolm X, a prominent
black nationalist leader. Id at 262. Stokely Carmichael, SNCC Director, was a co-
founder of the Black Panther Party. Id. at 291.
162 These groups focused inward, and eschewed participation in the larger socio-
legal system. Some advocated repatriation to Africa.
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The Civil Rights Movement began as an effort to create a com-
munity which not only could transform its members into people
with power and dignity, but which also could change the social
world in which its members functioned. 163 As such, it was destined
to develop a "transformational politics" which could not be "con-
tained within the autonomous insularity of the [movement]
itself." 164
The more effective the Civil Rights Movement grew at the
street level, the more options opened for it on the policymaking
level. A determined voter registration effort by the organizations
which remained in the civil rights mainstream, launched in Alabama
in 1965, met with violence, brutality, and murder. The resulting at-
mosphere made federal action inevitable. Seventy million Ameri-
cans watched President Johnson's speech as he presented the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 to Congress on March 15, 1965.165
Southern legislators began to fall in line, and the Voting Rights Act
was passed on August 6, 1965.166
Blacks began to register to vote in record numbers. Prominent
blacks were appointed to key positions in the national government,
and several new Congressmen as well as the first black Senator since
Reconstruction were elected. All over the South, the fervor of the
Civil Rights Movement among the masses of black people focused
on campaigns for political office from mayor to dogcatcher. The
days of the social movement known as Civil Rights, with its empha-
sis on confrontation, dialogue, and the use of such techniques to
win converts, were over.
In its place, another sort of community developed which fo-
cused on government and had system-oriented blacks as its political
base.167 This new community actually functioned much more like
the interpretive community described by Professor Fiss, which has
positive law as its focus as well as dialogue. The juxtaposition of
this new civil rights community with its more discursive predecessor
will demonstrate that "implementive," not "interpretive," is the
more apt term for a community of this type.
163 Cf Cover, supra note 2, at 33 ("Redemptive Constitutionalism").
164 Id. at 34.
165 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 278.
166 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1982)).
167 J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 286-87. Such "legalization" may not always have
had felicitous results. See E & F II, supra note 40, at 712 (CLS argument that lawyers
representing the poor and unrepresented may even act as a pacifier of the victims of
oppression); see also President Reagan's parting shot at the Civil Rights Movement,
claiming that its leaders perpetuate ideas of oppression to keep themselves employed.
60 Minutes, (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1989).
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C. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights: An
Implementive Community
As the Civil Rights Movement relinquished some of its larger
goals to pursue more modest goals within new legal frameworks,
civil rights lawyers came to Washington to guard the structural
changes in the legal system the movement had achieved.' 68 A key
feature of their strategy has been the development of a network
which connects the public with the three branches of the federal
government through dialogue as well as the use of legal machinery.
They created a web of relationships which became as important as
the "rules" in creating and effecting policy. 169 This network, the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, continues today as a lobby-
ing and policymaking association of more than one hundred civil
rights organizations, church groups, and labor unions. 170
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights has characteristics
which are not accounted for by Legal Process as Hart and Sacks en-
visioned it. For example, the Conference readily penetrates the
boundaries of institutional competence which Hart and Sacks saw as
separating the different branches of government.
Similarly, the Conference surpasses the vision of the Critical
Legal Studies and Law and Economics approaches. The Conference
is not a mere faction or self-interested lobby of the type which domi-
nates the Law and Economics/Public Choice model.
Law and Economics, which characterizes statutes as "mere
deals between private groups and the legislature,"' 7 1 cannot fully
explain the civil rights legislation sponsored by the Conference.
CLS, concentrating on false communities created by alienated law-
yers, cannot explain the Conference either. A sense of the impor-
tance of human relationships seems to have carried over from the
168 See, e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 23 U.S.C. § 1447 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-I (1982)), and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-
284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982)). See Clune,
supra note 7, for discussion of the various professional roles available to "civil rights
lawyers," at 115-17 nn. 175-79 and accompanying text (law prophets), and at 116 n. 175
("second generation" administrative law reformers).
169 E & F II, supra note 40, at 706.
170 These organizations include, but are not limited to: the NAACP, the United
Auto Workers, the National Council of Churches, the National Council of Senior Citi-
zens, the American Association of Retired Persons, the American Civil Liberties Union,
the National Council of Negro Women, the National Urban League, the United Steel-
workers, the National Women's Political Caucus, the Disability Rights Education and
Defense Fund, the National Council of La Raza, the Women's Legal Defense Fund, and
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
171 E & F I, supra note 2, at 331.
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social movement from which the Conference sprang. Its members
view law and policymaking not simply as tools to manipulate for de-
sired ends,' 72 but rather as part of a larger process by which shared
values are created and expressed and a sense of community is rein-
forced. 173 The Leadership Conference, seeking ways to involve the
public at large in the setting of social norms,, is also struggling
against the type of lawyer's elitism CLS finds so objectionable. 174
Finally, the characteristics of Leadership Conference are not
adequately captured by the work of New Legal Process scholars such
as Professors Fiss and Cover, but rather seem to point toward a syn-
thesis of their respective work. The Leadership Conference is not
the elite group of legal professionals which populate Fiss's interpre-
tive community, yet it is also not simply thejurisgenerative group of
nonlawyers envisioned by Cover's interpretive community. Where
the Civil Rights Movement sought to engage the entire nation in
dialogue, its law and policymaking offshoot now precipitates conver-
sations binding interest groups and institutional actors together,
sometimes excluding, rather than including, others.' 75 Legal
"corpus, discourse, and interpersonal commitment" have melded in
a new kind of nomos, which has one foot in the redemptive commu-
nity of the Civil Rights Movement and the other in the highly
charged, awesome power of the national government. 176 In an at-
tempt to demarcate its uniqueness, let us refer to the Leadership
Conference not as an "interpretive community," but rather as an
"implementive" community. 177
Important, but beyond the scope of this Article, is a detailed
look at the inner workings of this community, of what Cover would
call its "paiedeic" nature. 78 What activities are necessary for par-
172 E & F II, supra note 40, at 714 n.69 (judicial review).
173 Id. at 714 n.67 (recommending reconstitution of the legislature to "encourage
broader community participation in the community's public discourse").
174 See Larry G. Simon, The New Republicanism: Generosity of Spirit in Search of Something
to Say, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 83, 90 (1987) (criticizing Horwitz for contending that an
objective public interest can be identified apart from the individuals who make up the
public); see also Marcin, supra note 11, at 3 (criticizing civic republican tradition as based
on a restricted franchise and exclusion of those not equal in wealth); cf Michelman,
Republic, supra note 19, at 1502 nn.30-31.
175 E & F II, supra note 40, at 717; see also id at 718-19 (civil rights laws, environmen-
tal protection statutes, and deregulation initiatives better explained by public-regarding
rather than interest-group theories). Thejob of the social movement, in contrast, was to
foment both confrontation and inclusion, thus furthering the social dialogue.
176 Cover, supra note 2, at 12.
177 On this process, see Clune, supra note 7, at 68-70. Professor Kingdon calls these
"policy communities." J. KINGDON, supra note 55, at 123-28 (detailed discussion of the
operation and composition of such communities).
178 Cover, supra note 2, at 12.
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ticipation in the implementive community? 179 How does a "com-
mon body of precept and narrative" evolve?18 0 What is the
"common and personal way" in which members are "educated
into" the nomos of the community?1 81 How is a "sense of direction
[and] growth ... constituted as the individual and [the] community
work out the implications" of their inner values and of the external
law and policy which they seek to create?18 2
Saving such considerations for a future article, I will instead ex-
amine what Cover called the "imperial" aspect of nomos.'8 3 In this
aspect, the community considers its norms universal, and seeks to
enforce them through external, legal institutions. While every no-
mos has both a paideic as well as an imperial mode, here we ex-
amine only the external conflict and contrast between the nomos of
the Leadership Conference and those public and private actors
whom it seeks to influence and/or control.' 8 4 The narrative is that
of a key civil rights struggle of the Reagan Era-the Civil Rights
Restoration Act.
1. The Civil Rights Restoration Act: A Clinical Case Study
The political pressure generated by the 1963 March on Wash-
ington for Jobs and Freedom, the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Sum-
mer, and the activities of the MFDP at the 1964 Democratic National
Convention made the Civil Rights Act of 1964 possible.' 8 5 Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited the use of federal tax dol-
lars to fund institutions which engaged in racially discriminatory
practices, but the Act left the duty of federal funding recipients to
refrain from discrimination ambiguous.' 8 6 Did an entire institution
have to be free of discrimination in order for any part of it to qualify
for federal funds, or was the nondiscrimination directive applicable
only to the specific program receiving federal aid?' 8 7
179 See, e.g., id. at 14 ("Any nomos must be paideic to the extent that it contains
within it the commonalities of meaning that make continued normative activity possible.
Law must be meaningful in the sense that it permits those who live together to express
themselves with it and with respect to it.").
180 Id. at 12-13.
181 Id. at 13.
182 Id
183 Id.
184 See, e.g., id. at 13-14.
185 See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
186 Title VI (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982)) provides: "No person .,. shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
187 The Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982), for example,
limit the loss of federal funds due to discrimination to "the particular program, or part
thereof, in which such noncompliance has been... found."
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The essence of implementation techniques such as legislation is
compromise between opposing forces and accommodation to the
imperatives of the legal system itself. Later statutes sponsored by
the Leadership Conference, which prohibited discrimination based
on sex (Title IX), 188 handicap18 9 and age,' 90 all contained the identi-
cal compromise. These additions to the scope of civil rights protec-
tions were spurred by a nation-wide dialogue in which
discrimination on the basis of sex, handicap, or age became unac-
ceptable.191 By turning to legislative implementation of their goals,
however, the social movements which spurred these causes declared
themselves part of the system.' 92
2. Grove City College v. Bell 19 3
Federal agencies, through their administrative regulations, first
addressed the uncertain scope of the antidiscrimination statutes.194
During the Carter Administration, federal agencies made the scope
of the duty not to discriminate quite broad, thus supporting the
forces which favored antidiscrimination. The Reagan Administra-
tion, on the other hand, favored conservative forces, especially in
the area of sex discrimination, and sought to narrow the scope of
Title IX.
Grove City was initiated by a private college against President
Carter's Attorney General, Griffin Bell, to combat the expansive in-
188 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), prohibits sex discrimi-
nation in educational programs or activities receiving federal funds. See Pub. L. No. 92-
318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-83 (1982)).
189 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits recipients of federal
funds from discriminating against disabled persons. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
190 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 prohibits discrimination on the basis of age
in the delivery of services and benefits supported by Federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-
6107 (1982).
191 This development contradicts public choice theory. See E & F I, supra note 2, at
332 ("Public choice theory ... indicate[s] that the legislature and the executive pay
insufficient attention to problems affecting marginalized groups .-... ").
192 See Minow, supra note 2, at 1874-75 (rather than fragmenting the group, creating
rights strengthens the community by institutionalizing relevant dialogue and by promot-
ing an understanding of the individual's relationship to the community-in essence, just
in claiming rights, one admits membership in a larger group).
193 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
194 Section 902 of Title IX directs agencies providing federal assistance to promul-
gate regulations requiring that recipients comply with the law, and requiring termina-
tion of assistance to noncompliants. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982). See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 24,
128 (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1981)).
Title IX enforcement authority was transferred to the newly-created Department of
Education by § 301 (a)(3) of the Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No.
96-88, 93 Stat. 677-78 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (1982)). Before 1980, the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare administered the Act and wrote the
regulations.
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terpretation of Title IX imposed by Carter Administration regula-
tions. 195 It addressed the question whether the entire college was
covered by Title IX because some of its students received Basic Ed-
ucational Opportunity Grants from the Department of Education. 9 6
The case was decided by the Supreme Court during President Rea-
gan's first term.
The majority held that Title IX barred sex discrimination only
in a "program or activity" that received federal aid, not the entire
educational institution. 197 The only federal aid the college received
was for student scholarships. Therefore, the Court reasoned, only
the student financial aid office need comply with Title IX. Discrimi-
nation carried on against women in other parts of the university was
beyond the reach of the statute.
Since "program or activity" language also appears in Title VI of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 198 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973,1 99 and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975,200 the majority
also implicitly narrowed the scope of each of these laws. In fact, the
Court so interpreted section 504 in a decision handed down on the
same day as Grove City. 20 ' The Department ofJustice moved quickly
to use the Grove City interpretation in all of its enforcement activities
regarding discrimination on the basis of race, sex, handicap, and
age.20 2 The Department of Education suspended investigations in
"hundreds of cases." 205 Similar policy shifts took place in the De-
partment of Health and Human Services and other federal
agencies. 20 4
195 By the time the suit reached the Supreme Court, the Reagan-era Department of
Education had retreated from the expansive view prevalent during the Carter Adminis-
tration. 465 U.S. at 561-62.
196 Id. at 559.
197 Id at 570-76.
198 42 U.S.C. § 2000j (1982).
199 29 U.S.C. § 294 (1982).
200 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1982).
201 Consolidated Rail v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984) (involving employment dis-
crimination against a disabled person).
202 LCCR I, supra note 152, at 2. See Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger
Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 650-51 (1986) (Burger
Court generally intervened in civil rights dialogues to subordinate the rights of the indi-
vidual to the perceived interests of the majority); see also Note, Grove City College v. Bell
and Program-Specificity: Narrowing the Scope of Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 34 CATH. L. REV.
1087 (1985) (authored by Dianne M. Picn6); Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education Amend-
ments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language with Its Broad Remedial Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1043 (1983) (authored by Claudia S. Lewis).
According to Professor Sherry, the Warren Court was the mirror opposite of the
Burger Court, intervening as in Brown I to prevent minority rights from being
subordinated to the will of the majority. Sherry, supra, at 652.
203 LCCR I, supra note 152, at 2.
204 Id.
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3. The Legislative Response
The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights decided to sponsor
legislation designed to overrule the Court's interpretation of the
"program or activity" language of the various civil rights statutes.
The legislation would establish that if any part of an institution re-
ceives federal funds, the entire institution must comply with antidis-
crimination law. 20 5 Thus, the definition of "program or activity"
would include the entire institution. The new law would require
that Grove City College not discriminate in any part of its opera-
tions in order to receive federal funds in its student financial aid
office. This first attempt of the Leadership Conference to overturn
Grove City, the Civil Rights Act of 1984, passed the House by a vote
of 375 to 32,206 but stalled in the Senate after a filibuster by oppo-
nents as the 98th Congress came to a close.20 7
Legislative attempts in the 99th Congress foundered because of
disputes regarding the reach of the bill in the area of abortion rights
and the extent to which the proposed law would cover religious in-
stitutions. These disputes took shape in a fight over two amend-
ments offered by conservative Republicans to the proposed "Civil
Rights Restoration Act." One, an "abortion-neutral" amendment,
would insure that institutions receiving federal funds would not be
forced to perform abortions. The Leadership Conference, however,
read the language as repealing "longstanding regulations protecting
students and employees against discrimination in education pro-
grams if they [chose] to have an abortion." 208 The other would ex-
empt religiously "affiliated" institutions as well as religiously
"controlled" institutions from Title IX coverage.20 9 The conserva-
tives ostensibly engaged in this legislative maneuvering to enhance
the position of religious groups such as the United States Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops.
The "abortion-neutral" amendment especially threatened to
fragment the Leadership Conference and undermine the interpre-
tive community around civil rights.210 The United States Catholic
Conference, a staunch member of the Leadership Conference on
Civil Rights, suddenly found itself split off from the other members
205 19 H.R. 5490, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H7052-57 (1984).
206 Id.
207 The companion Senate bill, S. 5508, was tabled by a vote of 53-45. 130 CONG.
REC. S12,640-43 (1984).
208 LCCR I, supra note 152, at 2. This amendment was offered by Representatives
Sensenbrenner and Tauke, of the House Judiciary and Education and Labor Commit-
tees, respectively.
209 Id.
210 On the origins of the "interpretive community" on civil rights, see supra notes
115-46 and accompanying text.
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of the Leadership Conference, especially the women's groups. Key
spokespersons in the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and in
the Catholic Conference developed a consensus which cleared the
objections of both sides in time to re-introduce the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act in the 100th Congress. 211 Despite extreme portrayals of
the bill's impact by conservatives, 212 the bill passed both houses and
President Reagan's eventual veto was overridden.21 3
D. The Role of the Supreme Court in the New Legal Process
The Supreme Court seems to play an important role in shaping
the dialogue of the community envisioned by New Legal Process
scholars such as Professors Michelman and Fiss. 214 Criticism of the
Court's role in this aspect of the New Legal Process continues from
the left215 and the right.216 Fiss's conception of the Supreme Court
as prophet seems rooted in the distinctive historical role the Warren
Court played as it opposed government compromises of individual
and minority rights, particularly during the Civil Rights era.2 1 7 Af-
ter Warren's resignation, however, the Supreme Court began to
take on a decidedly more conservative cast. The Leadership Con-
ference, operating in the legislative and regulatory as well as judicial
arenas, has in some instances been able to outflank the more con-
servative Court of today, as evidenced by the confrontation over
Grove City.
211 See Letter from United States Catholic Conference to President Reagan (Mar. 8,
1988) (expressing satisfaction with "abortion-neutral" character of bill).
212 Helen Dewar, Vote on Veto of Civil Rights Bill Stalled, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1988, at
A4, col. 1 (one allegation was that transvestites would have to be given positions as day
care instructors); see also Editorial, No Reason to Veto, Wash. Post, Mar. 16, 1988, at A22
(allaying fears that hospitals will be required to perform abortions or churches will be
forced to ordain women); Helen Dewar, Religious Leaders Assail Moral Majority's Scare Tac-
tics over Civil Rights Bill, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1988, at A8, col. 1 (attacking the Moral
Majority's allegations that the new bill would qualify drug addicts, active homosexuals,
and transvestites for federal protection as handicapped).
213 See, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Rights Gains Holding Their Own, Boston Globe, Mar. 29,
1987, at 1, col. I ("In broad terms, Reagan's assault on three decades of civil rights
legislation has failed; affirmative action for women and minorities has proven to be too
firmly embedded in American life for him to dislodge it.").
214 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEW
88 (1980) (judicial power used to perfect majoritarian processes); Michelman, Dis-
enchantment, supra note 13, at 262 (judges make their contribution to the politics of law by
carrying on with the work on the people's behalf, when the judges are in a better posi-
tion to do so than are others); see also Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 755 (judiciary has a
"special competence to interpret a text such as the Constitution, and to render specific
and concrete the public morality embodied in the text.").
215 See generally M. TUSHNET, supra note 54, at 150-58 (contending that faith in judges
as part of a continuing dialogue with the legislature and the public is misplaced, that
judges are first and foremost creatures of the positive law system).
216 See generally Fiss, The Death of the Law?, supra note 2, at 2-8.
217 See id. at 15. But see Cover, supra note 2, at 57-58 (citing Bickel).
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However, when President Reagan nominated Judge Robert
Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Leadership
Conference grew alarmed. According to William T. Coleman, Jr., a
black Republican 218 who had supported Bork's nomination to the
D.C. Court of Appeals,2 1 9 Bork was determined to overrule settled
Warren Court cases which "recognized in the Constitution ... fun-
damental liberties that Americans legitimately consider to be their
birthright. '220 Further, Bork "propose[d] step by step to reduce
drastically the scope of the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment." 221
Bork's departure from his general program of judicial restraint
to argue that the Court should actively overturn certain cases up-
holding federal civil rights statutes particularly troubled the Leader-
ship Conference. 222 Bork proposed similar judicial activism to
overturn state-mandated affirmative action programs. 223 Even
though Bork "repeatedly insist[ed] that aggrieved individuals and
groups should seek redress through the legislative process rather
than the courts," 22 4 he also consistently opposed Congressional leg-
islation to promote racial equality. 225
The Leadership Conference considered Bork a real threat, and
organized broad-based and effective opposition. Millions of Ameri-
cans watched the Senate hearings on television, where the Leader-
ship Conference's characterization of Bork as a "rigid ideologue, far
outside the mainstream of American public opinion," was confirmed
for many.226 The Leadership Conference framed a dialogue involv-
ing people from a plethora of backgrounds and regions of the coun-
try, examining values and principles inherent in our Constitution
218 See Elizabeth Drew, Letterfrom Washington, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 2, 1987, at 154
(Coleman is a "highly successful black attorney who . . . served in Gerald Ford's
cabinet").
219 William T. Coleman, Jr., Why Judge Bork is Unacceptable, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15,
1987, at 35, col. 1.
220 Id. at col. 2 (fundamental liberties endangered by Bork included "a right of mar-
ried people to use contraceptives; a right of people not to be sterilized against their will;
a right to marry, establish a home and bear children; a right to be taught a foreign
language and a right of parents to send their children to private schools").
221 Id.
222 Id. at col. 3. (Bork questioned the constitutionality of the public accommoda-
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
1970 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act.)
223 Editorial, The Case Against Bork, THE NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 5, 1987, at 10.
224 Coleman, supra note 219, at A35, col. 3.
225 Id.
226 Memo, Leadership Council on Civil Rights (August 1987), at 2 [hereinafter
LCCR II]; see also Drew, supra note 218, at 154 (Bork's belief that there was no constitu-
tionally-protected right to privacy and his opposition to "virtually every Supreme Court
decision that advances civil rights" came through in "thirty hours of Bork's testimony").
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and in our society. 2 27 Millions of people nationwide not only dis-
cussed the nomination of a Supreme Court Justice but important
issues of civil rights and civil liberties as well.
A poll taken by the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) in August, 1987 showed the suc-
cess of the mobilization and outreach effort by the Leadership Con-
ference: Large numbers of Americans were "very concerned" that
Bork would sponsor a retreat on civil rights and privacy.228 South-
ern whites who, as a group, once might have welcomed Bork, now
would "not necessarily support him." 229 A poll by the Roper organ-
ization, taken after Bork completed his testimony, showed that not
only did Southerners, white as well as black, oppose Bork, but many
conservatives opposed him as well.230 The political and legal tech-
niques developed by the Leadership Conference for implementation
purposes effectively combined with the residual moral authority of
the Civil Rights Movement from which it sprang for a resounding
victory.23'
However, the victory was one of "implementation" rather than
"interpretation." In the Bork struggle, there was confrontation, but
no dialogue between those who opposed Bork and those who sup-
ported him.23 2 The nomos represented by the Leadership Confer-
ence had incorporated the broadest base of the adherents it could
incorporate without shattering.23 3
The Leadership Conference could not create a consensus which
stretches across our civic community, despite the exclusion of Bork
from a key policymaking position within it.234 Bork's replacement, a
seemingly much gentler Justice Kennedy, has voted to re-examine
227 See Memo, Leadership Council on Civil Rights (Oct. 14, 1987), at 1 [hereinafter
LCCR III].
228 Drew, supra note 218, at 152.
229 Id at 153 (Southern whites did not want to re-open civil rights issues any more
than did Southern blacks).
230 Id. at 154. In fact, the Bork nomination may be seen historically as the factor
which split the Reagan consensus-a "tenuous and uneasy alliance" between conserva-
tive moralists and young libertarians who "don't want the government messing around
in their private lives." Id. at 153.
231 President Reagan apparently failed to effectuate the conservative social agenda
of his most ardent supporters. See Nadine Cohodas & Mark Willen, Angry, Defiant Bork
Insists on Senate Debate, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, Oct. 10, 1987, at 2437 (conservative
agenda included "an anti-abortion constitutional amendment, a sharp curtailment of af-
firmative action and prayer in public schools").
232 For Martin Luther King, Jr., even racist Southern sheriffs were part of the dia-
logue. J. WILLIAMS, supra note 113, at 182.
233 Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1521 n. 111.
234 Cf Cover, supra note 2, at 16 n.41 (discussing how the Massachusetts Bay Colony
maintained its holistic integrity through the expulsion of members like Roger Williams
and Anne Hutchinson).
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established civil rights precedents 23 5 and restrict affirmative action
programs, 23 6 just as Bork would have done. Bork is gone, but the
ideology he supported is not. Where can the Leadership Confer-
ence go from here?
IV
CONCLUSION: COMMUNITY BUILDING THROUGH THE NEW
LEGAL PROCESS
The search for community through social confrontation and di-
alogue ("interpretation") and through manipulation of the law and
policy system ("implementation") exist in intimate dialectic with
one another.237 Interaction in public life can create common under-
standing which makes resort to law less necessary, 238 and which
points toward a broad nomos in which "law is predominantly a sys-
tem of meaning rather than an imposition of force."2 39 Legal inter-
vention and implementation can shape public dialogue in ways
which will remain necessary until that distant future point at which
the ideal of full inclusive community might be achieved. 240 The
continuing interplay between interpretation and implementation
helps ameliorate the downsides of rule of the people and rule of law,
respectively. 241
Traditional ideas of law as a Newtonian system have been over-
whelmed by technological, economic, and ideological changes in
American society.2 42 These changes have provided opportunities to
bring Americans closer together as a community, as well as to divide
them. Continuing disagreements on issues such as civil rights have
also provided opportunities for dialogue out of which new norms
evolve.2 43 Participants in this dialogue-which includes policymak-
235 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (voting to re-examine
Runyon v. McCrury, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
236 Moore v. Richmond, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1989).
237 See Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1504-05 (dialectic between rule of law
as security and rule of the people as activity).
238 Tushnet argues that when we become a community we will no longer need ac-
tivist judicial review, for example. See Marcin, supra note 11, at 14-15 & n.33; see also
Michelman, Disenchantment, supra note 13, at 265-67.
239 Cover, supra note 2, at 12.
240 At such a point, law as we know it might no longer be necessary, but probably
would be replaced by something analogous to the customary law form now existing on
the international level. Until that point, social movements can create pockets of such all-
inclusive communities, internally governed by custom and remonstrance, and forbear-
ance, rather than resort to majority rule. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE CITY AND THE
GRASSROOTS: A CROss-CuLTURAL THEORY OF URBAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (1986).
241 Michelman, Disenchantment, supra note 13, at 258.
242 See Sherrill, supra note 56, at 2 (discussing the effect of communication, special
interest PACS, and the growing federal bureaucracy on political decisionmaking).
243 See Minow, supra note 2, at 1867 ("rights represent articulations... of claims that
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ing officials in the different branches of government as well as a
wide range of interested and informed observers-make law and
policy through this continuing process of discussion.244
The ideal of a national republican community of shared values,
the original aim of the American Revolution, was dulled by the com-
promises of the Constitution. Public values which all in our civic
community can share are not self-evident in the Constitution. 245 In
an important way, social movements have sought to create the
shared republican values suggested by the Constitution and ex-
pressed more forcefully in the Declaration of Independence. Social
movements cannot achieve a total incorporation of the civil commu-
nity into their interpretive community. Social movements which si-
multaneously adhere to their principles and engage the civic
community in dialogue, however, may alter the civil community's
base-line assumptions on issues such as peace, the environment,
poverty, the family, crime, drugs, and health.
The activities of implementation groups, such as the Leader-
ship Conference, may thus point toward the creation, issue by issue,
of "implementation" communities, for a practical, clinical dimen-
sion of the New Legal Process. This clinical dimension could in-
volve professionals in the law and policy implementation system and
members of the general public in an open and comprehensive dia-
logue on social direction, standards of performance, and the defini-
tion of ethical behavior.246
Clearly, such a conversation can and should range far beyond
the Supreme Court and, indeed, beyond the legal profession as a
whole. Fiss advances a preeminent role for the Court because of the
people use to persuade others ... about how they should be treated and about what they
should be granted").
244 E & F I, supra note 2, at 333.
245 See Cover, supra note 2, at 17 (meaning of the Constitution will always be "essen-
tially contested" because of the "diverse and divergent narrative traditions within the
nation."); see also Fish, supra note 2, at 1346 (indeterminacy in Court's articulation of
"public values" a reflection of the fact that such values derive from the political and
social visions that are always competing with one another for control of the state's ma-
chinery). But see Fiss, Conventionalism, supra note 2, at 192 (arguing that legitimate
choices can be made among these meanings); see also id. at 196 (convergence of law and
politics a distinctive feature of the American legal system).
246 See Peck, supra note 95, at 316-24 (calling for a "community presidency" to lead
the country, that is, a managerial team including the vice-president and all cabinet mem-
bers, who would be selected before the Presidential election and would campaign as a
team with the Presidential aspirant). But see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Dis-
covering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 (1984) (Constitution's explicit commit-
ment to the institutions of contract, private property, and state's rights pose stark limits
to the viability of interpretative communities as a means of social organization). This
process, already beginning with the proliferation of nonprofit "implementation" groups
in the nation's capital, points toward a modem version of Jeffersonian republicanism.
Cf Patrick Esmond White, WPFW Radio talk show (Feb. 21, 1989).
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special position ofjudges as authoritative interpreters of the law,2 4 7
and criticizes the "nihilism" of those who do not recognize the
state-and especially the judge-as a legitimate source of normative
interpretation.248 Cover's response would be that the delegitima-
tion of the judge's claim to normative interpretation does not create
a nihilistic void, but rather opens channels for hermeneutic
dialogue.249
Federal courts have certainly not been the sole institutional ac-
tors in the implementive dialogue around civil rights law.250 The
institutional actors in that dialogue have extended far beyond the
three principal branches of the federal government. Policy-making
agencies and officials of government-federal, state, and local-may
be called upon to implement federal civil rights law, both by official
pronouncement and by force of example.25' Members of the United
States Congress, the President, members of state legislatures, state
governors, city council members, and federal department officials
all participate.252 Private participants of various stripes, including
corporate executives, labor union officials, and school administra-
tors, join the public actors. If conversation about civil rights can
broaden in this way, it can focus more on the capacity of civil rights
norms to teach us and to strengthen our society's moral and eco-
nomic dimension, and it can focus less on positivist clashes for
power. 253 A worthy aim for the Leadership Conference is to
broaden the dialogue to include more and more people, gradually
moving towards a social solidarity based on something other than
rights, entitlements, and rules.254 Such a dialogue could itself grow
more extensive, touching on social issues such as labor, manage-
ment, the environment, human services, national defense, the econ-
omy and the budget as well as civil rights. Such a dialogue could
247 See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 755-56 (judicial interpretation not only "legiti-
mates the use of force against those who refuse to accept [the court's] interpretation...
but [also makes] an ethical claim to obedience... because the judge is part of an author-
ity structure that is good to preserve.").
248 Id. at 762-63.
249 Cover, supra note 2, at 44.
250 Compare Fiss, The Death of the Law?, supra note 2, at 15 (Warren Court responsible
for belief in the existence of public values). What about Rosa Parks? See Michelman,
Disenchantment, supra note 13, at 259 n.21.
251 Cf WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
ROLES FOR LAWYERS AND SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 2 (1987).
252 Id. at 3.
253 E & F I, supra note 2, at 333.
254 See Fish, supra note 2, at 3 (agreement is not a function of rules but rather of the
fact that assumptions and procedures are so widely shared as to appear the same to all);
see also Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1529 (pursuit of political freedom through
the law means constantly expanding the number of people in the dialogue).
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help rejuvenate our political community. 255
At present, our civil community embraces everyone within our
national boundaries, but its "members share no common awareness
... 256 Our civil community exists in constant tension between
"what is and what might be," and depends for its existence upon "a
line of human endeavor that brings [the two] into temporary or par-
tial reconciliation." 257
The clinical dimension of the New Legal Process, exemplified
by the actions of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, is a law
and policymaking process, put in operation by social movement law-
yers. On the plane of legal ideology, it has a place in our jurispru-
dence: It examines current knowledge and context (Legal Realism),
in the light of closely held, "self-evident" community values (Re-
publicanism), against a backdrop of legal tradition (Legal Formal-
ism). The clinical dimension of the New Legal Process creates a
community in which relations among people, shared experience,
and moral example compete with positive law as a means of resolv-
ing disputes. 258 It uses dialogue to overcome the entropy and con-
fusion perpetrated by the closed nature of the law and policy
system, particularly separation of powers and excessive reliance on
rules, which has bedeviled previous legal ideologies. 259 At the same
time, it uses rules to restrain the energy released by open confronta-
tion in a community which has not yet found ways to include all its
proper members. 260
The alternatives to coordination of our national agenda
through the type of dialogue suggested by the New Legal Process
range from the nation continuing in a "mildly unhappy and improb-
ably feasible mix of disconnected substantive goals and programs"
to the nation degenerating into an "insupportable condition of en-
tropy and confusion." 261 A national dialogue about necessary social
255 Michelman, Republic, supra note 19, at 1528-32.
256 Cover, supra note 2, at 14.
257 Id. at 39.
258 See Minow, supra note 2, at 1862 ("[t]he interpretive approach permits debate
over legal and political choices without pretending a social harmony that does not exist
and without foreclosing social changes as yet unimagined"); see also Michelman, Dis-
enchantment, supra note 13, at 256 (referring to this process as the "politics" of law).
259 See Cover, supra note 2, at 39-40 (dialogues used to overcome the constitutional
interpretation which supported slavery).
260 See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 2, at 755.
261 Clune, supra note 7, at 109. An example of the latter would be a budgetary crisis
(resulting when the compromises worked out by thousands of separate implementations
are simply too costly and it is difficult for the system to identify acceptable interprogram
tradeoffs). Id. at 110.
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choices could reinforce our democracy. 262 Social movement lawyers
and academics who interact with and study social movements can
facilitate that dialogue, but cannot carry it on alone.263
262 See id. at 111 n. 167 (in systems analysis terms, the goal is the best policy determi-
nation through the most open and diverse process possible while at the same time keep-
ing the risk of inappropriate decisions within acceptable limits).
263 See E & F II, supra note 40, at 723 (New Legal Process dialogue should not be
limited to professionals); see also Brest, supra note 2, at 771.
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